- In the list of factors that can not individually give cause for processing personal information add “marital state,” and “nationality,” and replace “sexual life” with “sexual orientation.”
- Enumerate available information sources, and remove language that grants intelligence services access to all information sources.
- Do not keep records of information pertaining to journalistic sources to comply with ECHR.
- Wiretapping of representatives of the people and notary publics should be tested by a court.
- Court records related to wiretapping journalists and lawyers shall be made public.
- Require authorization from the minister or head of intelligence service before constructing a complete overview of a person’s personal life.
- Automated access to third-party databases should be considered a special competence, and require authorization from the minister and the oversight committee.
- Require that the authorization committee consider previous judgements from the oversight committee.
- Allow the authorization committee to consult outside experts.
- Do not allow agents to work as journalists or aid workers.
- Do not allow intelligence services to create a DNA-databank.
- Only allow intelligence services to access third-party systems that are in direct technical relation to a target.
- Do not allow intelligence services to acquire access to medical devices in or on a person’s body when this violates the physical integrity of the person.
- Only require decryption from parties if they possess a decryption key.
- Make explicit which devices are “automated devices.”
- Do not gather intelligence which is not relevant to a specific investigation.
- Do not allow the expansion of wiretapping competencies to cable-bound communications; limit it to not-cable-bound communications.
- Reduce data retention from three years to one, to comply with ECHR.
- Retain data only when it is directly relevant to an investigation.
- Require that data analysis is done for a specific purpose.
- Require that telecom operators are fully reimbursed for costs resulting from wiretaps.
- Allow telecommunications providers to publish aggregated “transparency” reports.
- Require targets of surveillance to be notified, five years after surveillance has taken place, when deemed possible by the minister.
- Require targets of DNA-analysis to be notified, five years after analysis has taken place, when deemed possible by the minister.
- Do not allow intelligence to share raw data with foreign intelligence services.
- Do not allow intelligence to share raw data with foreign intelligence services without a formal agreement. Require existing agreements to be tested and formalized.
- Set a time limit for publishing oversight committee reports to parliament.
- Allow the oversight committee to order intelligence services to cease its activities when such activities are illegal.
- Allow the house of representative to overrule the oversight committee when it orders the intelligence services to cease an activity.
- Do not allow intelligence services to order parties to weaken or backdoor encryption technology.
- Allow persons to request their own personal data via e-mail.
- Do not allow foreign intelligence services to gather intelligence inside the Netherlands without oversight from dutch intelligence services.
Cris van Pelt